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Why do countries pick one electoral system over another? As Damien Bol , Jean-Benoit Pilet
and Pedro Riera write, there is often an assumption that the choice of an electoral system is closely
related to the calculations of dominant political parties who select systems that are likely to beneﬁt
them in elections. However based on a study of European countries between 1945 and 2011, they
illustrate that the choice of an electoral system can be shaped signiﬁcantly by the choices of
neighbouring/similar states.
In recent years, the possibility of changing the electoral system has emerged on the political agenda
of many democracies. In 2011, the Conservative-Lib Dem government in the UK organised a referendum on the
question of replacing the country’s ﬁrst past the post system used to elect the House of Commons with an
Australian-like alternative vote system, and the debate over electoral reform has reignited after the 2015 general
election.
Elsewhere, in the 1990s, the Italian government implemented a variant of the German mixed-member system for the
election of the lower house of the national parliament. About 10 years later, the decision was made to turn back to a
proportional representation system with a seat bonus for the largest coalition. During the 2012 presidential election
campaign in France, several candidates (including the current President François Hollande) advocated the
introduction of some form of proportionality in the two-round system used for legislative elections.
Following these events, a broad community of researchers have been studying the reasons why governments and
legislators choose one type of electoral system over others. According to many of these authors, the ruling elite
seeks to secure its own position by anticipating the eﬀect of various possible electoral systems on the allocation of
seats.
Despite their international and comparative focus, the assumption is often made in these studies, usually implicitly,
that episodes of electoral system choice are independent from each other. Actors involved in these processes are
often presented as being completely unaware of, or at least not aﬀected by, what is happening abroad. Yet there is
no reason to discard the possibility of international diﬀusion of electoral systems. In a recent study, we use data from
European countries between 1945 and 2011 to test the hypothesis that the adoption of electoral systems that are
superior in terms of electoral outcomes tends to spread among peer countries.
The case for limited proportional representation
Every electoral system has pros and cons. One of the fundamental issues for electoral engineering is the trade-oﬀ
between fair representation and accountability. Proportional representation tends to produce more inclusive
parliaments than ﬁrst past the post. However, the system’s rules also result in a greater number of parties in
parliament, and therefore a decrease in the chances that a single party will win an absolute majority of seats. Under
such circumstances, governments are usually composed of coalitions of more than one party, which tend to
undermine the identiﬁcation of which parties are to blame (or to be rewarded) for good and bad policy outcomes.
However, in an article published in 2011, John Carey and Simon Hix suggested we alter our perceptions of this
trade-oﬀ by arguing that an electoral ‘sweet spot’ exists. This sweet spot emerges when a system tempers pure
proportional representation to produce an arrangement whereby excessive party fragmentation and the unfair
exclusion of small parties are balanced, thus achieving the most eﬃcient representation. According to them, a
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proportional representation system that is combined with either low-magnitude multimember districts (i.e. districts
where a low number of representatives are elected) or high electoral thresholds can hit the electoral sweet spot. Our
research builds on this by arguing for the diﬀusion of low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds in the
post-war period in Europe.
Testing the theory
In our study, we analyse spatial-temporal trends in the use of low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds in
proportional representation systems of European countries between 1945 (or the ﬁrst democratic election) and
2011. To do so, we rely on data collected within the Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945 project, for
which national experts have been invited to translate the electoral rules of all European democracies.
Our sample shows quite a large variation in the usage of low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds.
While some countries have continuously used at least one of these mechanisms and often both (especially recent
democracies such as Estonia, Hungary or Lithuania), other countries, such as Finland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, have never implemented any of them. On average, 75 per cent of European countries have used at
least one of the mechanisms at one point in time.
We also observe an overall increase in the use of at least one of the two electoral mechanisms. This increase is
particularly striking in the 1990s following the democratisation of Central and Eastern European countries. Most of
these countries adopted high electoral thresholds, which are nowadays used to elect national legislatures in more
than 50 per cent of European democracies employing proportional representation (although they were almost never
used at the beginning of the covered period). By contrast, the overall use of low district magnitudes remains
relatively constant over the sampled period (at around 30-40 per cent). The following table describes the countries
included in our analysis, and the ﬁrst election and last election for which low district magnitudes and high electoral
thresholds have been used.
Table: European countries with low magnitude/high threshold PR systems
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Note: The table shows the ﬁrst democratic election included in the study alongside the
period in which countries have used either low magnitude district or high electoral threshold
proportional representation systems.
To test our hypothesis, we estimate logistic models predicting the adoption of either low district magnitudes or high
electoral thresholds according to the proportion of peer countries that have adopted them within a given time-span.
We use several deﬁnitions of peer countries, namely historical (same democratisation period), linguistic (same
linguistic group), and geographical (common boundaries). The ﬁgure below reports the coeﬃcient estimates (and
the 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals) associated with the diﬀusion variable for low district magnitudes, for historical
peer countries, and for all time-spans between two (i.e., the current and the immediately preceding years) and ten
years.
Figure: Result of the analysis
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Note: See the author’s longer paper for more information on these calculations.
We see that the eﬀect of diﬀusion diminishes as the time-span increases. The diﬀusion eﬀect is strong and
statistically signiﬁcant when diﬀusion is deﬁned as the proportion of adoptions among peer countries within the last
two, three or four years. This eﬀect is much smaller when the diﬀusion time-span is set at ﬁve years (and more).
These results suggest that the diﬀusion trends among peer countries are rather short-lived and that the adoptions
abroad stop having an inﬂuence on domestic decisions after a couple of years. The results are similar for adoption of
high electoral thresholds.
These eﬀects are robust to various statistical speciﬁcations, to our three deﬁnitions of peer countries, and to the
inclusion of various controls including those capturing the classical explanation of electoral system choice (i.e., seat-
maximisation and party system fragmentation). As further evidence supporting this argument, we also ﬁnd elements
of diﬀusion in parliamentary debates surrounding episodes of electoral system change in several countries.
Overall then, despite the international and comparative focus of much of the scientiﬁc work on electoral system
choice, the literature still often fails to take into consideration that electoral engineering processes at the national
level do not occur in a vacuum. Our empirical analysis supports the existence of short-lived international trends in
the adoption of low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds. The likelihood that a country adopts one of
these arrangements increases with the number of peer countries that have recently adopted a similar system.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
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of the London School of Economics.
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